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1. INTRODUCTION
Ben Eggleston’s comment nicely weaves together several
strands of the approach to normative ethics that informs the
essays in Part II of Facts, Values, and Norms. I quite agree
with what he says concerning how and where the strands might
reinforce one another, so I will concentrate in my reply on the
places he finds strains and gaps  especially his questions con-
cerning the nature of valoric consequentialism and how it
might differ from more familiar forms of consequentialism.
As mentioned in the Précis above, the chief aim of valoric
consequentialism is to translate as directly and faithfully as
possible into the domain of practical ethics what I think of as
the guiding consequentialist idea: the touchstone in moral
assessment is the effect of what we do and how we are on the
good of all concerned. I take ‘‘good’’ in the broad sense that
extends beyond welfare, and includes all the forms of intrinsic
value realized in and through our lives. The basic evaluative
category of valoric consequentialism is fortunateness. Rough-
ly, the fortunateness of x  where x ranges over acts, mo-
tives, experiences, practices, act-tendencies, etc.  is a
function of how much x contributes to the overall good of
those affected; x is more fortunate than y, other things equal,
to the extent that x contributes more than y to this good.
2. ACT UTILITARIANISM, RULE UTILITARIANISM, MOTIVE
UTILITARIANISM, AND COOPERATIVE UTILITARIANISM
Straight off we see differences between valoric consequential-
ism, on the one hand, and act or rule utilitarianism, on the
Philosophical Studies (2005) 126:491499  Springer 2005
DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-2320-7
other. The latter are theories of moral rightness, an essentially
deontic, binary notion, as applied to individual actions.1
Moral fortunateness is an evaluative notion, a matter of de-
gree, and directly applicable to a wide range of moral phe-
nomena.
Does this difference in the entry-point of consequentialist
assessment into practical ethics matter? Consider: By an act-
utilitarian standard, all suboptimal acts are morally wrong
alike. By a rule-utilitarian standard, all acts out of compli-
ance with an acceptance-optimal code are wrong alike. But
from a valoric consequentialist perspective, a near-optimal act
may be almost indistinguishable morally from an optimal
one, and crucially different morally from an act far from
optimality. Such differences in magnitude become especially
salient when we consider an agent’s acts over time. Looking
through the aperture of right and wrong, we see in the evalu-
ative foreground the relative frequency or proportion of right
acts. Yet imagine two well-disposed agents who face a similar
series of choices, one of whom devotes equal energy to detail
in almost every decision while the other is more selective in
her attention. Over a span of time, the first, let us say, acts
optimally with high consistency, but loses sight of the forest
for the trees and acts quite non-optimally in a few very con-
sequential decisions. The second acts sub-optimally much
more frequently, but by focusing attention and effort on the
larger choices, acts in these cases acts much closer to opti-
mally. From the standpoint of consequentialism’s guiding
idea, mere frequency of right action seems to have little sig-
nificance compared with overall advancement of the good.
Similar differences arise when we consider the evaluation of
practical dispositions and motives. Are the best dispositions
from a consequentialist standpoint those that lead most
reliably to right action? The example above suggests
otherwiseselective attention might be a more fortunate prac-
tical attitude in general, despite a higher frequency of right
actions. Moreover, a good deal of the value contributed by
attitudes and motives to the value of an agent’s life and the
lives of those around her is not a matter of action. Thus, in
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his criticism of orthodox utilitarianism, Bernard Williams
challenges its ‘‘act-adequacy premiss’’ (1973, 120). And in his
defense of ‘‘motive utilitarianism,’’ Robert Adams urges that
ethicists should reject ‘‘the assumption that ‘What should I
(try to) do?’ is the ethical question, and that we are engaged
in substantive ethical thinking only insofar as we are consid-
ering action-guiding principles’’ (Adams, 1976, 474). He offers
motive utilitarianism not as an alternative theory of right ac-
tion, but as an evaluative theory in its own right that applies
the guiding consequentialist idea directly to motives. In effect,
he adopts a valoric consequentialist approach to the ethics of
motive, asking which motives are more fortunate than others
 either in general, or in a specific setting  taking into ac-
count all the ways in which motivation can enrich or impov-
erish lives. Note that his question is not equivalent to asking
which motives it would be optimal to encourage or which mo-
tives would arise from internalizing an ideal code  it is a
matter of which motives it is most fortunate to have, either in
general or in specific circumstances.
A satisfactory consequentialist ethics of action should
expand its evaluative focus yet further beyond the rightness
of individual acts, to incorporate the potential value of joint
action involving multiple agents. As Donald Regan (1980,
chs. 24) shows, all of the agents in a group can individually
satisfy an act- or rule-utilitarian standard of right action, and
yet fail to coordinate with one another, even when coordina-
tion would be much more fortunate overall.2 Like Adams,
Regan locates the flaw of act and rule utilitarianism in their
‘‘exclusive act-orientation’’ (see Regan, 1980, 114). To have
the adaptability required to cooperate beneficially in an open-
ended class of contexts, agents must not simply act rightly,
given their situation, but be the way required to create situa-
tions: actively disposed to read situations in terms of the
opportunities they afford for beneficial coordination, to imag-
ine how the situation looks from the standpoint of others and
thereby envisage which points of coordination or strategies
are salient to them, and to trust one another enough to initiate
unsecured cooperative behavior. Like successful communica-
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tion in open-ended conversations, successful coordination in an
open-ended class of contexts requires more than a collection of
agents, each of whom applies a similar standard or follows the
same rules, and an ethics of action should reflect this.
3. ‘‘MIXED THEORIES’’ AND SOPHISTICATED
CONSEQUENTIALISM
The most straightforward way of expanding the scope of con-
sequentialist practical ethics beyond orthodox theories of the
rightness of individual acts is to develop a ‘‘mixed’’ norma-
tive theory, embracing several forms of consequentialism at
once, neither of which is given evaluative primacy. Adams
suggests what he calls ‘‘act-and-motive utilitarianism,’’
according to which individuals should both avoid acts
‘‘gravely detrimental to utility’’ and avoid being ‘‘in a bad
motivational state’’ (Adams, 1976, p. 477). For example, an
act-and-motive utilitarian agent would likely be disposed to
steer clear of a life-choking concern always to act for the best
or of a coordination-defeating concern to require assurance
from others before cooperating. At the same time, she would
possess a sufficiently active conscience and critical awareness
to realize that sometimes it is of cardinal importance to iden-
tify and do the most fortunate thing, or to require evidence
of cooperativeness  even though this goes strongly against
her motivational grain.
Sophisticated consequentialism (Railton, 1984) seeks to
make room for just such ‘‘mixed’’ ways of thinking about
how to live. A sophisticated act consequentialist, for example,
can approve of agents who possess a mixture of commit-
ments, loyalties, motives, and spontaneous cooperative dispo-
sitions, since these are a necessary part of the most valuable
and contributory lives, even though they will also sometimes
lead agents not to attend to utilitarian considerations or to
act wrongly by act-utilitarian standards. Just which commit-
ments, loyalties, motives, and dispositions to have, with
degree of strength and deliberative autonomy, and with what
place for explicitly consequentialist reasoning or at what cost
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to rightness in conduct, will of course depend upon what is
most fortunate given an agent’s actual context and capacities.
4. VALORIC CONSEQUENTIALISM
However, Eggleston is correct in his suspicion that I now be-
lieve the limitations of act utilitarianism as a consequentialist
theory of morally right action call for more than sophistica-
tion. Moreover, Eggleston and I share the view that a more
credible consequentialist theory of right action is not to be
found in the form of rule utilitarianism, however ingeniously
improved. Hence my attempt to introduce valoric consequen-
tialism as an alternative. This brings me to Eggleston’s two
chief concerns, both of which arise when a valoric consequen-
tialist mixed theory incorporates ‘‘a non-act-utilitarian stan-
dard of rightness.’’
(1) If act- and rule-utilitarian accounts of morally right ac-
tion are inadequate from a valoric perspective, what would a
more adequate consequentialist theory of right action look like?
Eggleston insists that any consequentialist worth her salt
must regard the act that would bring about the greatest
value3 as ‘‘morally noteworthy,’’ and the valoric consequen-
tialist concurs, deeming it the most fortunate act. In moral
and prudential deliberation alike, the most fortunate act has
a strong claim to be the one we have most reason to perform.
Optimization is not the only game in town, but it certainly
enjoys widespread recognition as a compelling standard of
rational choice in the prudential case, and act utilitarianism
gains some of its credibility by deploying this standard from
a moral point of view.
However, even though the optimal choice is in one obvious
decision-theoretic sense right, for a choice to be morally right
is a different matter. The concept of ‘‘moral rightness’’ comes
to the consequentialist already well-embedded in our moral
thought and practice. If ‘‘morally right’’ meant ‘‘optimal
from a moral point of view,’’ ‘‘morally wrong’’ would natu-
rally be ‘‘less than optimal from a moral point of view.’’
But moral wrongness goes with notions of blameworthiness,
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condemnation, resentment, and guilt, and we do not typically
dispense these for mere suboptimality. Moreover, our reactive
attitudes characteristically attach not only to individual acts,
but to act-types characterized in ways substantially indepen-
dent of their consequences  e.g., breaking a promise, betray-
ing a friend or spouse, etc. We would experience betraying a
friend, even for his own good, as shameful  something
understandably resented and calling for apology. By contrast,
failure to benefit a friend maximally when one is already do-
ing him a good turn does not feel shameful, and resentment
on his part or a demand for apology would strike us as
churlish.
In light of its embedded nature, moral rightness is most
naturally treated by the valoric consequentialist indirectly,
through some variant of contextualism. Relative to a moral
context  which includes prevailing moral practices, the state
of knowledge, and feasible (‘‘nearby’’) options  there are
certain expectations any reasonable person might have of her-
self or others. Failure to live up to these expectations natu-
rally brings down our reactive attitudes. Some expectations
seem reasonable in almost any context  to take promises
seriously, to be honest, to refrain from actively harming inno-
cents, etc. Other expectations vary in strength or relevance by
context  to assist others in need, to cooperate actively, to
do one’s share. Right and wrong with regard to individual
responsibility for the well-being of others will differ for a
nomadic society vitally dependent on resource sharing, a
prosperous, egalitarian, or functional welfare state, a highly-
inegalitarian post-industrial society with decaying social
services.4
Is there not a grand theory of moral rightness behind these
judgments  in effect, an ideal moral code akin to that of
rule utilitarianism? The rule utilitarian’s ideal code can be
only as comprehensive and specific with regard to contexts as
ordinary human capacities to learn and apply it permit, open-
ing up the unfortunate possibility of ‘‘rule worship.’’5 Contex-
tualism about right and wrong, by contrast, is not a moral
code but a theoretical framework for asking what is more or
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less fortunate and feasible for agents across the wide range of
variation in human thought, practice, and circumstance.6
(2) Suppose we had in hand an adequate consequentialist
theory of right action. If it is incorporated as part of a
valoric‘‘mixed’’ theory that also includes (say) a theory of apt
motivation, does not practical deliberation require that one
evaluative category have primacy in decision? To someone
holding a mixed theory of this kind, one and the same act
can be both (1) the almost-inevitable upshot of the motives it
is most fortunate for the agent to possess, and (2) morally
wrong. Rather than collapse all dimensions of moral assess-
ment into one, valoric consequentialism seeks to portray
these diverse types of reasons and their respective degrees of
severity accurately. How much more fortunate is the act than
alternatives? How grave are the harms involved? How con-
trary would the act be to the agent’s motives and commit-
ments? And so on.
But how are agents aware of these diverse magnitudes and
dimensions to reach a univocal decision to act? If we say that
fortunateness always has primacy, this risks marginalizing the
notion of moral wrongness and atrophying associated reac-
tive attitudes. On the other hand, if we say that rightness has
primacy, regardless of how unfortunate the act might be, we
court the risk of ‘‘rule worship.’’
However, a dimension of evaluation need not be given lexi-
cal priority in order to be treated seriously. We try to balance
competing demands of family and career without undue sacri-
fice of either  the health of each is important for the health of
the other. Scientists make career-shaping decisions about
which hypotheses to accept or pursue by making trade-offs
among informativeness, fruitfulness, explanatoriness, and de-
gree of confirmation. And even the strictest deontologists allow
that justice must be tempered by mercy. The balances we strike
in such cases seem to us far from arbitrary, whereas it can feel
quite arbitrary to insist that one dimension always has primacy
 as if we were closing our eyes to what is in plain sight.
Valoric consequentialism seeks to provide a general frame-
work for moral assessment that recognizes the distinctive
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place and role of various elements in our moral lives and self-
understanding. An ideal rational choice theory would bring
all dimensions of moral assessment into a single hierarchy or
metric, which then would incorporate all the prudential, aes-
thetic, epistemic, and personal dimensions of our lives as well
into one grand optimization problem. But absent this unlikely
prospect, we face a choice: either insist on according primacy
to one dimension of morality and of our lives, or accept a
‘‘mixed’’ theory that frankly recognizes the need for balanced
judgment.
Faced with a choice between /-ing or not /-ing, we must
decide what to do. Even so, the constituents of action  be-
liefs, desires, attention, emotions, effort, deliberation, cooper-
ativeness, and commitment  come in degrees, as do our
reactive attitudes and notions of responsibility. It is one of
the lessons of moral dilemmas, I argued, that the manner in
which one /s can matter as much as whether one /s. It is
one thing if Sophie chooses with difficulty and regret, another
thing if she does so without pang or sadness.
NOTES
1 I am simplifying for the sake of contrast, and speaking in the objective
mode for ease of exposition.
2 For example, even the most sophisticated versions of rule utilitarian-
ism (e.g., Hooker, 2000) cannot rule out the possibility that several ideal
codes might be equal-best in light of all plausible desiderata (including the
desideratum of closeness to extant moral views), so that two agents can
follow acceptance-optimal codes to the letter without coordinating.
3 Or, to put things in the subjective mode, the act with the highest ex-
pected value.
4 John Rawls introduces a similar dependence of the principles of justice
upon the state of development and mode of life of a society, e.g., in the
transition from the general to the special conception of justice (Rawls,
1971, 42f).
5 The ideal code of rule utilitarianism does have a natural place within
a valoric mixed theory, as part of a direct consequentialist theory of an
ideally just society. For this purpose, stipulating widespread compliance
(within the general constraints of human psychology) is appropriate.
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6 Contextualism about moral right and wrong is not a form of moral
relativism, since the underlying judgments of fortunateness themselves 
and the theory of intrinsic good upon which they depend  are not rela-
tivized. For further discussion of relativism, see my reply to Justin
D’Arms.
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